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U.S. Military Accountability for
Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts:
An Examination of Okinawa, Envirorimental
Justice, and Judicial Militarism
Alan Ramo•
Local resistance to the relocation ofa US. military base to a bay threatening an t:ndangered
sea I11llllll11/ll off the coast of the island of Okinawa raises importJmt issues regarding the
extraterritoriality ofUS. environmt:nt1lllaws, the role ofthe courts in reviewing military operations,
and ultimately t:nvironmt:nt1ll justice. These issues are being played out in an island community
that for centuries has tried to survive by balancing the greatpowers ofChina, Japan, and the United
States. 0./dnawans now find themselves a minority subject to discrimination in Japan and still
suffering fiom the impacts of the legacy of US. occupation and continued use of US. bases on
their culture, economy, and environment
Federal courts continue to inconsistently sort out the extraterritoriality of US. laws,
including environmt:nt1ll laws. Already one t&k:rai court has applied the National Historical
Preservation Act to this controversy in Okinawa. Strong BlgU111t:nts remain that the National
Environmt:nt1ll Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act should also apply to the US. military's
actions in Okinawa. Although the modem United States Supreme Court has reversed earlier cases
and given great deference to military operations, a fbrm ofjudicial militarism, t:nvironmt:nt1ll
justice demands and case law allows these environmt:nt1lllaws to shape US. military conduct on
Okinawa andprotect its t:nvironmt:nt
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But the Pentagon is not yet sovereign. The military is simply another
administrative agency, insofar as judicial review is concerned.
-Honorable William Douglas 1
Environmenflll Justice opposes military occupation, repression and

exploitation oflands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms.
-Principles ofEnvironmental Justice2
But my job is to teach these natives the meaning of Democracy and they're
going to learn Democracy if! have to shoot every one of them.
- Fictional Col. Wainright Purdy lit
1.
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 51 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Comment,
Military Tnal ofCiVI1ian Offenses: Drumhead Justice in the Land ofthe Free, 43 S. CAL. L. REv.
356, 377-78 (1970}).
2.
First Nat'! People of Color Envtl. Leadership Summit, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 24-27,
1991); The Principles of EnVIivnmenflll Justice (EJ}, E NVTL J UST. REsOURCE CENTER, http://
www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.pdf (last updated Apr. 6, 1996).
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INTRODUCTION

A renewed battle over the proposed relocation of the United States
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma on the island of Okinawa,
Japan, raises a web of issues regarding the U.S. military's environmental
and, in particular, its environmental justice obligations abroad. It also
raises profound issues about the role of the courts in overseeing military
operations. To some extent, one can collapse these issues into the
extraterritoriality of U.S. environmental laws. All of these questions
focus upon an extremely endangered mammal barely surviving near a
proposed military base expansion on an island that for hundreds of years
has tried to find some autonomy and balance among competing great
powers.
What makes Okinawa such an interesting setting is its historical and
judicial context. Okinawa has now "reverted" to Japan after U.S.
occupation and centuries of influence and control by China and Japan.
However, the United States continues to operate bases in Okinawa as a
legacy of World War II and its dominant, nearly colonial, occupation of
Okinawa. Bases remain in Okinawa because of perceived security
threats from North Korea and China and the history of conflict in
Southeast Asia. It thus remains a major force on the island. 4
For that reason, the ability of U.S. courts to oversee U.S. military
operations is a critical question for the Okinawans. Federal courts
continue to inconsistently sort out the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws,
including environmental laws. Already, one federal court has applied the
National Historical Preservation Act (NHPA) to this controversy in
Okinawa.' Strong arguments remain that the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) should also
apply to the U.S. military's actions in Okinawa.
The modem United States Supreme Court has reversed earlier
decisions and given great deference to military operations, establishing
what this Article charges is a kind of 'judicial militarism." Thirty-two
years ago, Justice Douglas could write the words quoted at the beginning
of this Article calling the U.S. military just another administrative agency
during the unpopular Vietnam War. Today, Chief Justice Roberts has no

3.
JOHN PATRICK, THETEAHOUSEOFTHEAUGUSTMOON act I, sc. I, at 13 (1957).
4.
This Article's author became acquainted with Okinawa's history, environmental
challenges, and struggle for self-determination and justice while serving there as a staff attorney
for a nonprofit antiwar center representing U.S. military personnel during the latter years of the
Vietnam War.
5.
Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2005).

56

TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol 28:1

hesitation to hold that military preparedness in the absence of a war is a
sufficient basis to trump environmental laws even in U.S. coastal waters. 6
Nevertheless, this Article s_uggests that the __text of binding U.S.
environmental statutes, properly interpreted case law, and pQlicy based
upon environmental justice standards allows U.S. environmental laws to
shape U.S. military conduct on Okinawa and protect its environment.
Part II of this Article provides a very brief overview of Okinawa's history.
Part III discusses the U.S. military occupation and Okinawa's reversion to
Japan. Part IV focuses on the political and legal conflict surrounding the
relocation of the MCAS Futenma. Part V examines the extraterritoriality
of two applicable U.S. environmental laws. Part VI attempts to reconcile
the law of extraterritoriality, the demands of environmental justice in
Okinawa, and what I describe as the philosophy of judicial militarism in
the federal courts.
II.

OKINAWAN HISTORY

"[T]he postwar 'Okinawa problem' was produced by events set in
train long ago by accidents of geography and history."' Okinawa is the
largest island of Japan's Okinawa Prefecture's more than 160 islands,
known as the Ryukyu Islands or archipelago. 8 Known as the "Keystone
of the Pacific," it is located strategically, often to its peril, between Japan,
China, Taiwan, and South and North Korea. 9
"The Ryiikyiian are an indigenous group of people[]." 10 Okinawa
currently has 1.4 million people in the Prefecture. 11 The people speak
distinct languages. Okinawans have their own political, cultural, and
religious traditions, while incorporating cultural traditions imported from
China and Japan. 12
6.
Wmter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
7.
GEORGE H . KERR, OKINAWA, THE HISTORY OF AN ISLAND PEOPLE 3 (Tuttle Publ'g
2000). Kerr's text was first published in 1958, id, at the request of the island's U.S. military civil
administrator and may reflect U.S. policy bias as a result, but it is a seminal detailed history.
8.
Okinawa Infonnation, K.ADENAAIRBASE (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.kadena.af.miU
library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=7287. The island is 67 miles long and can be as little as two
miles and as large as seventeen miles wide. Jd
9.
ld It is closer to Manila, Taipei, Shanghai, and Seoul than Tokyo. Minority Rights
Grp. lnt'l, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples- Japan: Ryukyuans
(Okinawans), REFWORLD (2008), http://www.refworld.org/type,countryrep,mrgijpn,49749cfdc,O.
htrnl.
10. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supra note 9.
11. Okinawa s Population Estimated To Exceed 1.4 Million, RYuK.YU SHIMPO (Aug. 31,
2011 ), http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/20 11/09/09/2816/.
12. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supra note 9. These languages are considered part of the
Japonic language family, which also includes Japanese, while the Japanese consider these
languages dialects. ld
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The Okinawan people have a long history of delicately balancing
their position between China and Japan, and eventually the United
States. 13 In 1372, the Okinawa kingdom peacefully accepted China's
supremacy, which practically meant that it had a formal trading
relationship with the Chinese empire and paid it tribute. 14 Japan became
increasingly interested in Okinawa and was making its own demands on
Okinawa for tribute by 1480.u
The restoration of imperial authority in Japan and Japan's
emergence as a world power in the nineteenth century resulted in part
from Western powers opening up trade and concessions in China and
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In the midst of this period came the United
States' Commodore Matthew Perry and his war ships, which stopped at
Okinawa. 16 Meanwhile, Okinawa continued to pay tribute to China, and
Okinawa's king secretly asked for China's help to ward off Japan. 17
Technically, Okinawa remained a separate kingdom until the
Japanese annexed the Ryukyu Islands in 1879, deposed the king, and
took over administrative responsibilities. 18 With Japanese annexation,
Okinawans found themselves perceived as a distinct minority in a larger
country and discriminated against officially-through the banning of
their language-and other less official methods: 19 "From this point on,
the treatment of the RyiikyUans is one which many indigenous peoples
around the world are familiar with: loss of traditional forms of
government and control over land and resources, as well as steps to
supplant their distinct cultural and spiritual beliefs."20
Japan's assertion of its "mythical homogeneity'' exacerbated the
problem, as Okinawans were already perceived as being "strange" .and
13. KERR, supm note 7, at 3. Prior to the frrst brief American occupation of Okinawa in
1854 by Commodore Matthew Perry, it was a community "maintained without arms through a
period of 450 years, a nation of courteous officials, farmers, fishermen, and traders." Jd
14. Jd at 66. While generally Okinawa was a peaceful nation, there is a history on tpe
island of competing kingdoms engaged in intrigue and succession conflicts. Okinawa was fmally
unified in 1429. Jd at 15, 86.
15. Jd at 140. Japan did successfully invade in 1609 and exercise effective economic
control thereafter, though the Chinese did their best to maintain their influence with the elite. See
id at 158, 166.
16. Jd at 354.
17. Id at 370.
18. Id at 10. Japan "peacefully," though with a garrison of troops ready, abolished the
kingdom, in part to preempt an expected visit by former U.S. President Ulysses Grant (who was
feared to be interested in helping the Okinawans). Id at 382-83,387.
19. Steve Rabson, Being Okinawan in Japan: The Diaspom Experience, AsiA-PAC. J.:
JAPAN Focus (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Steve-Rabson/3720 ("At that time
signs excluding Korean and Okinawan workers were everywhere in Osaka." (citation omitted)).
20. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supmnote 9.
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"wrong."2 ' Japan denies any notion that there is a separate Okinawan
ethnicity that is subject to discrimination. 22
The great catastrophe for Okinawa was the. Japanese military
mobilization and occupation in World War II. Okinawa formed the outer
defense line for Japan. 23 Local people "were forced to suffer great
privation in yielding their meager stores to the occupying forces." 24
Okinawa's geography led to the horrific battle for Okinawa; it was
part of the United States' island-skipping strategy to bring the war to
mainland Japan. In eighty-two days, 12,000 American servicemen,
90,000 Japanese military men, and 62,000 Okinawans died. 25
While Okinawans had some awareness of a growing danger, "[t]o
the very last the government refused to disclose the gravity of Japan's
war position or to alert the public to the inuninence of disaster." 26
According to the Congressional Research Service, "Many Okinawans
remember this battle as a dark episode in a long history of the Japanese
central government sacrificing Okinawa for the good of the mainland."27
Okinawans directly connect Japan's annexation and discrimination
with the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. 28 As stated by the
Congressional Research Service analysts: "The attitudes of native
Okinawans toward U.S. military bases are generally characterized as
negative, reflecting a tumultuous history and complex relationships with
'mainland' Japan and with the United States."29

21. Rabson, supmnote 19.
22. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supmnote 9.
23. KERR, supm note 7, at 463. The Japanese military built airfields, and "three full
divisions of Japanese soldiers (more than the total local population) were quartered there at the
war's end." Id
24. ld
25. Id at 5 ("[T)he great majority were civilians caught helplessly between opposing
armies."). The Congressional Research Service suggests the deaths of civilians may have been
much higher, in the 40,000-100,000 range. EMMA CHANLEIT-AVERY & IAN E. RINEHART, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV, R42645, THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA AND THE FlJTENMA BASE
CONTROVERSY 3 (2012) (citing SABURO IENAGA, THE PACIFIC WAR, 1931-1945, at 185 (Random
House, Inc., 1978)).
26. KERR, supmnote 7, at466.
27. CHANLEIT-AVERY & RINEHART, supm note 25, at 4.
28. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supm note 9 ("At present, the United States' military
presence and the discriminatory policies of the Japanese government that facilitate the US
military occupation of the islands dominate the time and energy of most politically active groups
in Okinawa.").
29. CHANLEIT-AVERY & RINEHART, supmnote 25, at 3.
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III. U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATION AND REVERSION
The post-war history and status of U.S. forces in Okinawa are
critical elements in determining the application of U.S. environmental
laws to the U.S. military base siting in Okinawa. After World War II, the
U.S. military occupied Okinawa as enemy territory (captured at great
10
cost) and wanted to retain control. The war left the Okinawan society
and its infrastructure destroyed. 31 The U.S. military took over the existing
Japanese military bases and built many more, sometimes by seizing the
land. 32
After years of indecision within the U.S. government about how to
preserve its control over Okinawa, the United States signed a peace treaty
with Japan in 1951, which determined Okinawa's future. 33 In article 3 of
the treaty, the United States established its total control over Okinawa,
though technically Japan retained title, so Okinawa would not be legally
considered a colony or U.S. territory: · "[T]he United States will have the
right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and
jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including
their territorial waters." 34 The United States proceeded to rule Okinawa,
in most respects, like a colony.35
The United States strengthened its military hold on Okinawa while
bringing investment and aid, producing a fast-growing economy! 6 This
base-dependent economy, however, also created dysfunctions in
Okinawan society. Bases physically displaced agricultural land and
absorbed agriculturallaborers. 37 Okinawan base communities developed
catering to military personnel, causing significant damage to Okinawan

30. NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES, KEYSTONE, THE AMERICAN OcCUPATION OF OKINAWA
AND U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS 22 (2000); sec United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145,
148 (D. Haw. 1954) ("The United States has ... acquired, and still retains, what may be termed a
'de facto sovereignty' [over Okinawa]." (quoting Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 608 (9th
Cir. 1951) (alteration in original))).
31. SARANTAKES. supra note 30, at 31 .
32. CHANLEIT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 4 ("The United States paid locals for
the acquired land, but in some cases this purchase reportedly involved deception or outright
coercion using bulldozers and bayonets to evict unwilling residents.").
33. SecTreaty ofPeace, U.S.-Japan, art. 14, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169.
34. Id art. 3; sec Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. at 148 (citing San Francisco Conference on
Japanese Peace Treaty: Statement by John Foster Fulles, 25 DEP'T ST. BULL. 447, 452-59
(1951)); KERR, supra note 7, at 7.
35. SARANTAKES, supra note 30, at 61 .
36. Sec id (citing U.S. OFFICE OF TilE FED. REGISTER, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATE..<;: DwiGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1960-61 ~ 198, at 513 (2005)); Text of
Eisenhower's Report to the Nation on Far East Trip, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1960, at 4).
37. SARANTAKES, supra note 30, at 69.
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women. 38 "An air force analysis estimated that 90 percent of all the bars
catering to Americans were fronts for organized prostitution." 39
Okinawan sources report a survey conducted in 1969 finding that 7,400
women worked in the sex industry. 40 •
Meanwhile, U.S. military and civilian administrators ruled Okinawa.
Slowly, Okinawa was given the ability to elect local and regional officials.
Okinawans were becoming a force of their own with frequent massive
protests, including antiwar protests, as the United States became
embroiled in Vietnam. 41
Eventually, the saga of diplomatic and political machinations in the
United States and Japan over what to do about Okinawa culminated in
1971 when Japan and the United States adopted a 1972 treaty reverting
administrative control to the Japanese.42 Articles II and ill of the treaty
assured that Okinawa was subject to the security treaties and agreements
previously signed in 1960 and 1953 allowing continued U.S. base
operations. The 1960 security treaty provided, "[T]he United States of
America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities
and areas in Japan.'>4 3 The 1960 Status of Forces Agreement stated,
"Within the facilities and areas, the United States may take all the
measures necessary for their establishment, operation, safeguarding and
control.'>44
At the time of reversion, the Japanese legislature separately passed a
resolution calling for base reduction in Okinawa.45 However, the U.S.
bases · remained, and only slowly has the United States reduced its
presence. "The main island of Okinawa comprises 0.6% of Japan's land
area and is smaller than Long Island, yet it hosts 74% of the [U.S.]
38. In 1974, the author personally observed run-down communities adjacent to the bases,
typical of what one would fmd in third-world communities impacted by the U.S. military, with
cheesy disco clubs, cheap restaurants and women soliciting.
39. SARANTAKES, supmnote 30, at 73.
40. Suzuyo Takazato, Violence Against Women Under Long-Tenn US. Military Station
in Okinawa, JCA-NET 11-12, http://www.jca.apc.org/wsf_support/2004doc/WSFJapUSBaseRepo
Fina!All.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
41. SARANTAKES, supmnote 30, at 195. One protest resulted in the cessation ofbombing
runs from the Kadena Air Force Base during the Vietnam War. Jd
42. Sec Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, at
564, June 17, 1971,23 U.S.T. 446; scca/soSARANTAKES, supmnote 30, ch. 29.
43. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.-Japan, art. VI, Jan. 19, 1960, 11
U.S.T. 1632.
44. Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.lapan, art. ill, para. 1, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652 [hereinafter 1960 Status of Force
Agreement].
45. SARANTAKES, supm note 30, at I 92.
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military bases in Japan." 46 About half of the 38,000 U. S. military
personnel stationed in Japan are in Okinawa.47 As recently as 2012, there
were an additional 50,000 U.S. residents.'8
The Okinawans now find themselves balancing being·a minority in
Japan while continuing to be subject to the legacy of occupation by a
superpower, the United States. These dynamics of Okinawan life are
fueling the controversy and opposition to the MCAS Futenma relocation.
IV. THE MCAS FUTENMA RELOCATION CONFLICT

A.

Background

After a particularly heinous rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl
in 1995, Japanese and U.S. authorities, operating as the bilateral Security
Consultative Committee (SCC) (created under the nations' security
treaty), formed a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) with
the purpose of reducing the burden of the United States' presence on
49
Okinawa. The SEC recommended twenty-six initiatives, including the
relocation of the MCAS Futenma off Okinawa's east coast and the return
of the original base's land to Okinawa once replacement facilities were
constructed. In 1996, SACO created the Futenma Implementation
Group (FIG) to develop these plans.50
The MCAS Futenma is currently located in Ginowan City. As often happens with U.S. overseas military bases, social and economic
conditions led to an influx of urban development to the point that the city
now surrounds the base.51 Japanese officials, driven by objections from
Okinawans concerned with their safety (fears of aircraft crashes were
con!mned in 2004) and tired of the noise, pollution, and crime, called for

46. Japan Culture NYC, Nago Mayor Says US Bases ':<l Legacy ofMisery" in Okinawa,
RocKET NEWS 24 (May 24, 2014), http://en.rocketnews24.com/2014/05/24/nago-mayor-says-usbases-a-1egacy-of-misery-in-okinawal.
47. CHANLETI-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 8.
48. Okinawalnfonnation, supranote 8.
49. Sangwon Yoon, Okinawa Mayor lnvo./res Sea Cow Deaths To Stop US. Base,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 21, 2014), http://B1oomberg.com/news/2014-05-21/0kinawa-mayorinvokes-sea-cow-deaths-to-stop-u-s-base.htm1; see Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
50. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
2005) (discussing The SACO Final Report on Futenma Ali' Station, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF JAPAN § I.e (Dec. 2, 1996), http://www.mofa.go.jp/regionln-americaluslsecurity/96
saco2.html).
51. Yoshio Shimoji, The Futenma Base and the US. -Japan Controversy: An Okinawan
Perspective, AsiA-PAC. J.: JAPAN Focus (May 3, 2010), http://www.japanfocus.org/site/make__pdfl
3354.
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the closure of the base and its relocation. 52 U.S. authorities saw the value
in removing its air activities to a less-congested area.
However, in December 1996, the SCC members approved replacing
the MCAS Futenrna with an offshore sea-based facility (SBF)
somewhere off the east coast of Okinawa. The SCC created FIG, a
bilateral Japan-U.S. committee under the SCC's supervision, to
implement the plan. 53 The United States Department of Defense (DOD)
funded FIG at around $4 million a year.54 In 1997, while the Japanese
government was charged with selecting the specific site, the DOD
provided the specific parameters for the new base. Pursuant to those
requirements, the governor of Okinawa designated the precise SBF site
in 1999- an area in Henoko Bay that would become a landfill, adjacent
55
to Camp Schwab, located next to a town in the North called Nago.
Nago has been described as "a tourist town with beautiful beaches
and a pineapple park. Its waters are home to gorgeous coral and seagrass
57
beds."56 Part of the municipality is a fishing hamlet known as Henoko.
During the Vietnam War, 150 to 200 "G .1. bars" operated in the
"entertainment" area of Henoko, ''with many also functioning as secondfloor brothels." 58 More recently, only sixteen bars remain, and Henoko
has been described as a sleepy hamlet, with its residents engaged partly
with agriculture and fishing but mainly subsisting on income from the
base through land rentals and employment, construction projects, and
small family stores.59

52. Martin Fackler, In a City on Okinawa, Mayor's Re-Election Deals a Blow to Marine
B&·e Relocation Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, at A6.
53. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 2 (discussing The SACO Final Report on
Futenma Air Station, supra note 50, § I.e).
54. ld at 3 (citing DEP'T OF THE NAVY, FYI999 AMENDED BUDGET ESTIMATES:
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES 16 (1998)).
55. Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://globalsecurity.
org/military/facilitylhenoko.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). Targeting the bay next to Camp
Schwab could not have been much of a surprise, given the Marine Corps' prior efforts to expand
into the bay. Jd In 1962, the military had a plan to build a military port and actually began
blasting and drilling in the waters to expand the bay. Steve Rabso;n, Henoko and the US.
Military: A History ofDependence and Resistance, AsiA-PAC. J.: JAPAN Focus (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://wwwjapanfocus.org/sitelmake_pdf73680. Protests by local fishermen warded off that idea.
Id

56. Japan Culture NYC, supra note 46.
57. Fackler, supra note 52, at A6.
58. Rabson, supra note 55 ("Aside from admonitions by chaplains, the military did little
to discourage the widespread patronage of prostitutes. In fact, official policies had the effect of
encouraging it.").
59. /d (citation omitted).
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Nearby, there is still an unspoiled coastline.w The landfill would
likely destroy the area's coral reef and potentially damage nearby habitat,
including the few remaining seagrass beds in the area. lpese seagrass
beds are fed on by the endangered Okinawa dugong, a cousin of the U.S.
manatee. The Okinawa dugong is isolated and genetically distinct, with
only 50 of them still surviving off Okinawa's coast. 61
The Okinawa dugong is quite a symbol for U.S. insensitivity to
Okinawans. It is associated with Okinawa's creation mythology, folklore,
62
and rituals of traditional Okinawan culture. Its main predators are
63
humans. The Japan Ministry of the Environment has listed it as
endangered and as a protected "natural monument" on the Japanese
Register of Historic Places, Places of Scenic Beauty and/or Natural
Monuments under its "Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties.'.o.l
Nago actually held a referendum on whether to support the
relocation in 1997. A majority of the residents voted against the
proposae5 However, the national government used its financial and
political resources to change the mind of local officials, including a
succession of town mayors. 66 Local construction, bars, and restaurant
businesses looked forward to the economic benefits of a larger base.
Nevertheless, in 1998, 78% of Henoko residents signed a petition
67
circulated by an antibase organization opposing the base.
Given these economic incentives and political pressures, the then
current Nago mayor accepted the site location in 1999, a month after the

60. Yoon, supra note 49.
61. See John Roach, Rare Japanese Dugong Threatened by US. Military Base, NAT'L
GEOGRAPlllC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2007), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/newslpf761 082026.html.
The Okinawa dugong is related to Southeast Asia's dugongs, which can be found from Japan to
Australia. ld
62. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
2005) (citing Declaration of Isshu Maeda in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants'
Motion To Dismiss at 2-6, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP [hereinafter Declaration of Isshu
Maeda]).
63. Roach, supra note 61.
64. Dugong, No. C 03-4350, slip op. at 5 (quoting Declaration of Masayuki Yonaha in
Support of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss at 3, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP).
65. Miyume Tanji, Report, US. Court Rules in the "Okinawa Dugong" Case,
Implications for US. Military Bases Overseas, 40 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 475. 476 (2008); see
also CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 10 (citing WILLIAM L. BROOKS, AsiA·
PACIFIC POLICY PAPERS SERIES No. 9, THE POLITICS OF FUTENMA BASE ISSUE IN OKINAWA:
RELOCATION NEOOI1ATIONS IN 1995-1997, 2005-2006, at 20 (20 10) ).
66. Tanji, supra note 65, at 476. A 07 summit costing 1.3 billion yen was held in Nago.
A "Northern Districts Development Fund" was funded with I00 million yen. Jd
67. Rabson, supra note 55 (citation omitted).
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governor signed off on ie8 In August 2000, a "Consultative Body of
Futenma Relocation" was established to provide a specific plan for the
relocation. 69 The body included local and national officials. In 2002, it
approved the decision to relocate the Marine Air Statton and its assets to
the Henoko district (offshore from the Marines' Camp Schwab). 70
The United States and Japan made additional changes to the design,
agreeing jn 2006 on a V-shaped runway partially built on a landfill that
71
But by then, Okinawans and the U.S.
extends into the bay.
environmental groups had joined together to stop the base.

B

Okinawan Activists and US. Environmentalists Successfiilly Sue in
Federal Court Under the·NHPA

A coalition of Okinawan and Japanese environmental peace groups
and activists, along with a U.S. environmental organization represented
by U.S.-based Earthjustice, came together behind a U.S. legal strategy to
stop the Futenma relocation to the Okinawa coast. 72 The complaint, filed
in 2003, initially entitled Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld,13 focused upon
the DOD's failure to carry out the requirements of the NHPA. 74
Specifically, the complaint ·charged that in locating the new site in
dugong habitat, the DOD failed to consider the impacts of the base
relocation upon the Okinawa dugong. 75
Congress enacted the NHPA to preserve "the prehistoric and
historic resources of the United States and of the international

68. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 3 (citing Declaration of John D. Hill in
Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss at 3, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP).
69. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085 (N.D. Cal'. 2008) (citing
Motion for Summary Judgment ex. 15, art. xxv, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C 03-4350
MHP)).
70. Id (citing Motion for Summary Judgment ex. 13, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C
03-4350 MHP)).
71. ./d at 1086 (citing Motion for Summary Judgment ex. 19, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d
1082 (No. C 03-4350 MHP)). Each runway would be 1,600 meters in length plus 200 meters as
"overrun" areas. Id
72. Id at 1083. The complaint also lists the Okinawa Dugong as one of the plaintiffs,
hence the name of the case, but the court dismissed it as a plaintiff per Ninth Circuit precedent
that the APA only allows suits by persons. Id at 1093 (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d
1169 (9th Cir. 2004)). The plaintiffs were the Center for Biological Diversity, Thrtle Island
Restoration Network, Japan Environmental Lawyers Federation, Save the Dugong Foundation,
Dugong Network Okinawa, Committee Against Heliport Construction, Save Life Society, Anna
Koshiishi, Takurna Higashionna, and Yoshikazu Makishi. Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 1, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP.
73. See Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 1.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (2012).
75. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 72, at 2.
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community of nations." 76 While originally directed towards federal
actions within the United States, a more recent amendment, section 402
of the NHPH, applies to any federal undertaking of an action outside the
United States that "may directly and adversely affect a property ... on
the World Heritage List or on the applicable country's equivalent of the
National Register.'m If a property is so affected, the federal agency
carrying out the action must take into account "the effect of the
undertaking on such property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any
adverse effects.''78
The DOD first attacked the complaint on statutory grounds,
questioning whether "historical preservation" applied to a living animal. 79
The statute's section explicitly allowing extraterritoriality refers to actions
affecting "a property.'.so The judge, Marilyn Hall Patel, determined that
the animal was indeed "property," as that term is used in the statute,
because it was listed under Japan's equivalent of our National Register;
therefore, Judge Patel determined that it was entitled to protection under
theNHPA. 81
As the court explained, the OlQnawa dugong is listed as a "natural
monument" under Japan's "Cultural Resources Protection Law" and the
NHPA is explicit in its extraterritoriality to assure United States
compliance with the Convention Concerning the Protection of the Worid
Cultural and Natural Heritage. 82 The court recognized that the
Convention, and the NHPA's corresponding amendments intended to
come under the Convention, appreciated that cultures vary, so inevitably,
what each country lists as culturally important will vary.83 As the court
put it, "To require identical definitions of culture would eviscerate
section 470a-2's explicit recognition of 'equivalent' foreign lists.''84 • That
76. 16 u.s.c. § 470-l(b)(2).
77. Id § 470a-2.
78. Id
79. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
2005).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
81. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 12 (mentioning 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2). While
this decision has received some commentary questioning its validity, the court's analysis is a good
example how a U.S. law can be artfully applied extraterritorially without interfering with foreign
policy or military necessity. See Lauren Jensen Schoenbaum, The Okinllwa Dugong and the
Creative Application of US. Extraterritorial Environmental Law, 44 TEX.INT'L L.J. 457, 471-73
(2009).
82. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 17.
83. ld at 10-11 (citing Declaration of Thomas F. King, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs'
Opposition to Defendants' Motion To Dismiss at 21, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP [hereinafter
Declaration ofThomas F. King]).
84. Id at 11.
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is, Congress, by explicitly requiring deference to another nation's list of
protected cultural properties, was accepting that what another country
considers to be culturally important may be different than what the
United States considers to be culturally important. ·
The court further noted that practically, the approaches by Japan
and the United States to what is a culturally significant property resulted
in the same bottom line protection. Japan's listing of the Okinawan
dugong under its monument law was recognition of its historical and
cultural significance.85 The United States had listed locations because of
their role as habitat for historically important animals.86 The fact that
Japan chose to list the actual animal was not deemed a significant
difference. 87
The court then examined whether this approach was consistent with
the NHPA's specific definition of "property," which includes the word
"object." "Object" is defined by the applicable regulations as "a material
thing of functional, aesthetic, cultural, historical or scientific value that
may be, by nature or design, movable yet related to a specific setting or
environment." 88 With this definition, the court then had no trouble
finding that the Okinawa dugong is a "material thing" that has
"functional, aesthetic, cultural, historical or scientific value" and, in
particular, a special cultural significance in Okinawa. 89
Applying this regulatory defmition of "object," Judge Patel cited
uncontroverted evidence that in Okinawan creation mythology, the
Okinawa dugong is considered the ancestor of human beings. In
traditional Okinawan folklore, ''the dugong is revered as a 'female
.mermaid spirit,' worshiped at special shrines as a deity responsible for
successful fishing expeditions, and feared as an 'ocean spirit' capable of
creating tsunamis." 90 Other evidence described how shamans and
Henoko Bay residents sang songs about the Okinawa dugongs. 9 1
Therefore, the court found that the Okinawa dugong is "movable yet
related to a specific setting or environment," that is, Henoko Bay, and,

85. ld at 12 (citing Declaration oflsshu Maeda, supra note 62, at 2-6).
86. ld at 11 (citing Declaration of Thomas F. King, supra note 83, at 8-9, 16-17).
87. Id (citing Declaration ofThomas F. King, supra note 83, at 9).
88. National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.30).(2013).
89. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 14 (quoting Declaration of Isshu Maeda,
supra note 62, at 2-10).
90. ld (citing Declaration oflsshu Maeda, supra note 62, at 3, 9).
91. ld (citing Declaration of Isshu Maeda, supra note 62, at 10).
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ultimately, that it is an object deserving of consideration under the
NHPA. 92
Based upon the above-described analysis, the ~o}lrt found the
Okinawan dugong to be a protected property under the NHPA. 93 The
court then had to detennine whether the U.S. military in its activities
prior to 2005 had undertaken an action that threatened the Okinawan
dugong. The DOD tried to claim that the project was really being carried
out solely by the Japanese and was barred by the Act of State Doctrine.94
The court rejected the argument:
It would amount to a legal absurdity for this court to hold that, as a matter
of law, a facility constructed on behalf of and for the use of the United
States is not a federal undertaking, given the statute's explicit inclusion of
any ''project, activity, or program ... carried out by or on behalf of the
95
agency.

Judge Patel's decision is noteworthy for its sensitivity to Okinawan
culture and Japanese laws in interpreting a congressional mandate that
federal agencies respect international cultural resources. In that respect,
it applied a concept of the environmental justice doctrine, which
"demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for
all peoples" and provides a key for how U.S. courts and the military
should be required to proceed in the future. 96
However, even with this initial decision, the court noted that .
questions still remaine<\ as to whether the United States was in fact
continuing to undertake the project, its potential impact to the Okinawan
dugong, and whether the United States had properly consulted and
considered the fate of the species.97 These questions are central to
whether the court would be able to continue to assure U.S. military
compliance with the NHPA without compromising military necessity or
foreign policy.
Three years later, in 2008, Judge Patel again reviewed the DOD
compliance in Okinawa Dugong v. Gates 8 and had the opportunity to
focus upon what the project may mean for the Okinawa dugong. Once
again, the DOD argued that this was really a project by the Japanese and

92.
Jd (quoting Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendants' Motion To Dismiss ex. 3, at 129-30, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP).
93. ld at 17 (mentioning National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2).
94.
Id at28.
Id at 23 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7)).
95.
96.
The Principles ofEnvironmental Justice (EJ), supra note 2.
97 . Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 22,26 (mentioning 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2).
98 . 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (mentioning 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2).
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the court was imprudently meddling in a foreign country's affairs.99 The
court, after reviewing additional discovery, nevertheless found that the
DOD had undertaken the project and that its actions could be reviewed
without interfering with a foreign government:
·
[T]he United States has been substantially involved in the design and site
selectiop. for the FRF, will continue to monitor and oversee the construction
of the facility to ensure that it meets U.S. requirements, and will have
exclusive authority to operate the facility once it is completed . . . . This
court's review is directed solely at [the] DOD's compliance with the
NHPA.lOO

As to the impacts on the Okinawa dugong, the NHPA does not
require a showing that undertaking a project will actually destroy a
"property" before fmding a violation. According to the court, all that is
needed is a showing that an adverse effect "may" impact, either "directly
or indirectly, any of the characteristics" of a property and that these
impacts were not properly considered. 101
The court easily found that the proposed military facility operating
in or near a bay with Okinawa dugong feeding grounds (and where they
have been observed) would potentially cause adverse impacts. 102 The
impacts ranged from destruction of the Okinawa dugong due to
contamination of the seagrass to collisions with boats, "as well as longterm immune and reproductive damage resulting from exposure to 'toxins
and acoustic pollution."103 The court, based upon the NHPA's explicit
requirements and legislative history, ruled that the DOD had to generate
and consider information on how the project would affect the Okinawa
dugong, develop alternatives or mitigations if necessary, c;:onsult with
Japan, and do it all before approving the activity. 104
It is astonishing that, according to the court, the _DOD only
superficially considered the Okinawa dugong, even after the case was
filed in 2003. 10' The DOD claimed it had inadequate information and
that there was better seagrass in other locations, and therefore, it could

99. Id at 1097-98 (quoting Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment at 24, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C 03-4350 MHP)).
100. Id at 1098-99.
101. Id at 1101-02 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(l)).
102. Id at 1102.
103. Id
104. Id at 1108 (quoting National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2).
105. Id (''The current record contains no evidence that a single official from the DOD
with responsibility for the FRF has considered or assessed the available information on the
dugong or the effects of the FRF.").

2014] EXTRATERRITORIALENVIRONMENTALIA1PACTS

69

wait for the Japanese who would do their own analysis. 106 However, the'
court placed the responsibility for compliance with the NHPA squarely
upon the DOD and required that if it did not have the information, it
needed to get it, study it, and recommend appropriate· mitigation. 107
Further, all of this analysis needed to proceed and be concluded well
before the eve of construction and before there was an irretrievable
allocation of resources. 108
Particularly revealing of the DOD's approach was a DOD document
admitting that the base would cause environmental impacts and
suggesting that the Japanese just needed to exercise political will over the
''use" of these arguments.109 Judge Patel nailed the implications of this
statement squarely in her opinion:
Insofar as these statements suggest that DOD need not concern itself with
environmental impacts because they are unavoidable and are simply an
expedient used by opponents to obstru~;:t the FRF, these statements evince
at best, plain ignorance of, and at worst, complete defiance of DOD's
obligation to consider the impacts of the FRF on the dugong. The court is
unconvinced that DOD has expressed concern for, let alone taken steps to
consider the effects of the FRF on the dugong. 110

The decision in Gates is a model for how environmental laws can be
applied extraterritorially without interfering with foreign policy, as
further discussed in Parts V and VI below. However, while dealing a
temporary blow to the base's relocation, Japan and the DOD continued to
press ahead.
C.

The US. Military and Japanese National Government Strike Back

In August 2009, the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ), swept into power with its leader and then prime minister,
Hatoyama Yuk:io, promising to relocate the MCAS Futenma outside of
Okinawa. 111 In 2010, lnamine Susumu also campaigned for Mayor of
Nago, opposing the base in Henoko, and won. 112

106. Sec id at 1109-10 (quoting Declaration of Stephen Getlein in Support ofDefendants'
Motion To Dismiss at 3-4, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C 03-4350 MHP)).
107. Id at 1111.
108. Id at 1112 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2).
109. ld at 1108 ("[T]he environmental issues are primarily a question of political will
since any option will affect the environment and opponents will use environment-based
arguments to advance their cause." (citation omitted)).
110. Id
111. Rabson, supmnote 55.
112. Id
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But in May 2010, Hatoyama broke his promise. He claimed that he
had changed his mind about the need for the base for deterrence, though
113
later, after he resigned, he claimed that was a rationalization. The U.S.
military and Japan renewed their agreement to build 'the MCAS Futenma
off of Henoko. By December 2013, the governor of Okinawa, with full
and unqualified U.S. support, reportedly approved the project 11 4 after
there were "sweeteners" added. 11 5
Already, Okinawans have filed a lawsuit to stop the project in
Okinawa, and the Gates suit has been revived in San Francisco in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
addressing the DOD's failure to properly analyze project impacts and
116
consult with the public. The mayor of Nago was as resistant as ever,
promising to block construction permits 117 and telling a crowd in New
York City in May 2014:
[W]e believe that in 69 years after the war, we have suffered enough under
the presence of the US military bases. We have no more capacity to accept
a new base on the island. And as a result, the anti-base movement has
grown strong. Eighteen years later nothing has changed at Futenma
118
airbase; it is still exactly the same.

V.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF NEP A AND THE ESA AS IT AFFECTS
OKINAWA

While the court's opinions in the Dugong and Gates opinions were
well supported, it is striking how limited the decisions are. A battle over
a significant U.S. base siting in prime habitat for an endangered species,
filling in a bay, and affecting the social and economi<? life of a
community dependent, at least in part on fishing, is narrowly being
addressed under a U.S. law that requires consideration of the species only
in terms of its cultural significance as a historical property. More apt in
this situation would seem to be a law like NEPA, which requires a broad
113. Id
114. Erik Slavin, Chiyomi Sumida & Jon Harper, Okinawa Governor Signs Offon LongDelayed Futenma Relocation, STARS & STRIPES (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/news/
okinawa-govemor-signs-off-on-long-delayed-futenrna-re1ocation-1 .259407.
115. Chiyomi Sumida, Okinawa Suit Fi1ed To Stop WoJt on New Camp Schwab Runway,
STARS & STRIPES (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/okinawa-suit-filed-to-stop-workon-new-camp-schwab-runway-1.262085 (citing Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, Okinawa
Rakes in Concession as Futenma Decision Looms, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.
stripes.corn/news/Okinawa-rakes-in-concessions-as-futenma-decision-1ooms-1.248432).
116. First Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and ~unctive Relief at 3, Ctr. for
Biological Diversityv. Hagel, No C-03-4350 (MHP) (N.D. Cal. filed July 31, 2014).
117. Yoon, supmnote 49.
118. Japan Culture NYC, supm note 46.
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comprehensive analysis of environmental impacts, and the ESA, which
requires actual protection of endangered animals. 11 9
NEPA generally requires that each federal agency, when carrying
out a major federal action120 significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment,121 must provide a detailed statement on all of the
action's environmental impacts, 122 adverse environmental effects that
121
cannot be avoided, and alternatives. The agency must also evaluate
124
potential mitigation measures. If an agency fails to fully analyze or
consider a project's potential impacts, a court may enjoin the project. ~
NEPA, if applicable to the United States' Okinawa base siting, would be
able to address its broad range of impacts, including social and economic
impacts, to the extent that they relate to the environmental impacts. 126
The ESA's thrust is the conservation of endangered and threatened
127
species. It requires, with some notable exceptions, including so-called
incidental takes, that each federal agency "insure that any action . . . is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species." 128 The ESA specifically
prohibits, though again with some exceptions, the harming or killing of
any endangered species. 129
The Okinawa dugong is listed as protected under the ESA. no Thus,
the application of NEPA and the ESA to the Okinawa base siting could
have a profound impact on the DOD's decision making. As discussed
below, the federal case law regarding U.S. environmental laws'
extraterritoriality is somewhat inconsistent. However, an argument can
12

119. . See Schoenbawn, supra note 81, at 462-66 (recommending that the United States use
NEPA and the ESA to evaluate the impacts on the Okinawa dugong).
120. "Action" may include policies, plans, programs, or projects. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)
(2013).
121. Case law requires the analysis when substantial questions are raised as to whether a
project may cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor. Blue Mountains
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F. 3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)).
122. The statement is normally a fully comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4.
123. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
124. 40C.F.R. § 1502.14(f).
125. SeeBlueMountainsBiodiversityProjec~ 161,F.3dat 1216.
126. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14; see Alan Ramo, Environmental Justice as an Essential Tool in

Environmental Review Statutes: A New Look at Federal Policies and Civil Rights Protections
and Ca/ifomia sRecent Initiatives, 19 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & PoCv 41 , 48-52 (20 13 ).
127.
128.
129.
130.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(l) (2012).
Jd § 1536(a)(2).

Id § 1538(a)(l)(B).
50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)(2013).
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be made that NEPA and the ESA do apply to the Okinawa base
relocation.
A.

In Spite ofConflicting Case Lau-; NEPA and 'the ESA Should
Apply to Washington-Based Environmental Decision Making
Affecting Okinawa

Federal court decisions addressing extraterritoriality of U.S. laws all
claim to adhere to the basic presumption against the extraterritoriality of
U.S. law: "It is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 131 This
presumption rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily le~slates
with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters. 132 "Thus, 'unless there is
the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a
statute extraterritorial effect, 'we must presume it is primarily concerned
with domestic conditions."'133
Yet when federal courts apply these seemingly straightforward
principles, extraterritoriality analysis becomes quite complex and
· inconsistent. For example, in 1993, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the presumption does not
apply to NEPA in Environmental Defense f'und v. Massey. 134 The court
found that NEPA did apply to a proposal to incinerate wastes in an open
landfill at a U.S. research station in Antarctica. The court distinguished
Antarctica as a "global common," analogous to outer space. 135 The court
noted that the Supreme Court had recently found that the primary
purpose of the presumption is ''to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord." 136 The court then identified three situations when
the presumption does not apply: ( 1) where Congress expresses its
intention that it does apply, (2) where adverse effects will occur in the
United States, and (3) where the conduct to be regulated occurs in the
United States. 137
131. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Anunco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949)).
132. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,204 n.5. (1993).
133. Morrison v. Nat'] Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (quoting Anunco, 499
U.S. at 248).
134. 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
135. Id at 529 (citing Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
136. Anunco, 499 U.S. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,20-22 (1963)).
137. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531 (quoting Anunco, 499 U.S. at 248). ·
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Focusing on the third exception, the court noted that NEPA
regulates the decision-making conduct of administrative agencies that is
normally carried out in the United States: "Because the decisionmaking
process~s of federal agencies take place almost exclusively in this
country and involve the workings of the United States government, they
are uniquely do:r~estic." As a ·result, ''NEPA would never require
enforcement in a foreign forum or involve 'choice of law' dilemmas."u9
It was on this basis that the court held that the extraterritoriality
preS1,1ITlption does not apply to NEPA. 140
Admittedly, the court found that ''Antarctica's unique status in the
international arena further supports our conclusion that this case does not
implicate the presumption against extraterritoriality." 141 However, the
court noted this distinction after already concluding that the presumption
does not apply to NEPA decision making in the United States. The
Massey court pinpointed the language ·in Aramco that states that the
presumption applies only ''beyond places over which the United States
has sovereignty or some measure of legislative contro1"'42 The Massey
court cited with apptoval the D.C. Circuit's assumed approval ofNEPA's
extraterritoriality in Sierra Club v. Adams, which involved a highway in
Panama and Colombia with major federal funding. The court found no
foreign policy interests or competing sovereign interests preventing the
U.S. agency from applying NEPA to its Antarctica activities. 143.
Yet soon afterwards, a district court in the same circuit seemed to
rule otherwise in NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin. 144 In that case,
plaintiffs sought environmental impact studies for certain U.S. military
installations in Japan. 14' The district court in the D.C. Circuit, relying
upon the Supreme Court case Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 146 held that the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes limited
NEPA's application to U.S. military bases in Japan. 147 The court noted
138

138. ld at 532 •(citing Mary A. MacDougall, Extraterritorislity and tht: Endangered
SpeciesActof1973, 80 GEo.L.J. 435,445 (1991)).
139. ld at 533.
140. Jd
141. Jd
142. Jd (quoting Anunco, 499 U.S. at 248).
143. Id (citing Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
144. 837 F. Supp. 466,468 (D.D.C. 1993).
145. Id at 466-67. The brief memorandum opinion fails to delineate which bases were
involved, but they appear to be related to Tokyo Bay on the mainland. See Thomas E. Digan,
Comment, NEPA and the Presumption Against Extraterritorisl Application: The Foreign Policy
Exclusion, 11 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTHL. &Pot:v 165, 167 n.l7 (1994)(citations omitted).
146. 336 u.s. 281,285 (1949).
147. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at467.
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that the U.S. bases were operated pursuant to a treaty and the 1960 Status
of Forces Agreement. In these circumstances, the court found no
evidence that Congress explicitly intended NEPA to apply internationally
where there was a security relationship between the United States and a
sovereign power. 148 The court distinguished Massey based upon
Antarctica's different international status; however, it never fully
addressed Masseys primary rationale that NEPA only regulates U.S.
agency decision making that takes place within the United States.
Later, in 2005, the D.C. district court in Basel Action Network v.
Maritime Admim'stration held that NEPA does not apply to the high seas
due to lack of "legislative control;' thereby distinguishing Massey. 149 The
court questioned the continuing power of Massey. The court noted that a
month after Massey, the Supreme Court in Smith v. United States applied
the presumption against extraterritoriality to a federal statute's effect in
Antarctica. 15° Four months later in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
the Supreme Court found that the presumption against extraterritoriality
has "special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions
that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has
unique responsibility." 151 However, neither case cited Massey nor
addressed Massey's third exception.
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
ARC Ecology v. United States Department of the Air Force also
confronted the issues of extraterritoriality when evaluating the
application of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLAt 2 to former U.S. bases in
the Philippines. 153 In that case, primarily Filipino citizens and two U.S.
nonprofits petitioned under CERCLA to have the United States Air Force
conduct a preliminary assessment of the former Clark Air Force Base
and Subic Naval Bases' potential to release toxins into the environment.
The court first held that the language of CERCLA does not indicate
congressional intent to apply to foreign claimants, citing Sale and its
specific language upholding a presumption against extraterritoriality
involving military affairs.154 The Ninth Circuit case found that CERCLA
148. ld at 468.
149. 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 72 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
204 n.5 (1993)).
150. ld (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
151. 509 U.S. 155, 188 ( 1993) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936)).
.
152. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
153. 411 F. 3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005).
154. ARC Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1098 n.3 (citing Sale, 509 U.S. at 188).
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did not apply because at the time of filing suit, the bases had been under
the exclusive control of the Philippines government for ten years. 155 The
court also found a number of statutory clauses to be inconsistent with
extraterritoriality, such as providing venue in the distriCt where the
violation occurred. 156
Yet the ARC Ecology, Basel Action Network, and Aspin courts
overlooked the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush, which
found that no presumption of extraterritoriality applied to the U.S. base in
Guantanamo, Cuba. 157 The Court found that the habeas statute applied to
those suspected terrorists detained in the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
because the United States exercises '"complete jurisdiction and
control' . . . and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it
so chooses."' 58
As discussed above in Part IV.B, in 2008, a district court in the
Ninth Circuit in the Gates case found that the NHPA's text required
extraterritoriality for the Okinawa base siting. Additionally, while
looking at the same treaties and intergovernmental relationships between
the United States and Japan reviewed in the Aspin case, the court found
no foreign policy concerns interfering with court jurisdiction. The court
noted, consistent with Massey, that it was only focused upon the DOD
actions and obligations. 159
Applying these cases to Okinawa is not as straightforward as one
would hope. Okinawa is not the Philippines, as occupation of its bases
continues, nor is it Guantanamo, Cuba, as governance has technically
reverted back to Japan. As detailed above in Part II, Okinawa is not just
another part of mainland Japan. The original U.S.-Japan peace treaty, as
discussed above in Part III, did give the United States "de.:facto
sovereignty," as one federal court put it.' 60 The subsequent U.S.-Japan
security agreements gave the United States de facto authority over
155. ld
156. Jd at 1100 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b)(1); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 20203 ( 1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Anunco), 499 U.S. 244, 256 ( 1991 )).
157. 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ).
158. ld at 480 (quoting Agreement for the Lease (Subject to Terms To Be Agreed upon by
the Two Governments) to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations,
.S.-Cuba, art. ITI, Feb. 16, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
159. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F Supp. 2d 1082, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2008); sec also
Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 908-09 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (following
Massey and upholding the extraterritorial application of NEPA where the decision on a project
significantly affecting the domestic environment is made within the United States and where the
government agency may have control over the project's operation).
160. United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Haw. 1954) (quoting Treaty
ofPeace, supra note 33, art. 3).
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Okinawa, similar to the situation in Guantanamo,' 61 and as discussed
above in Part ill, U.S. control over the base relocation in terms of funding
and control is similar to the situation in Adams.
The Supreme Court itself has not applied 'the presumption where
the United States maintains sovereignty or "some measure of legislative
control." 162 As detailed in the Gates case, as discussed in Part IY.B, the
DOD is effectively controlling the site relocation decision in Okinawa.
In addition, the Massey court's focus on where the decisions are made, as
described above, applies to the DOD's decision about the MCAS
Futenma relocation. Key decisions were made at the very senior level of
the U.S. government, including by then U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. 163
Further, this is a case where the federal district court already has
. found that the NHPA can be applied to the base relocation without any
interference with foreign policy or military affairs, thus distinguishing
the Sale case. The Gates decision has not been appealed, and the U.S.
military has proceeded, as discussed above in Part IV, to live with delay
by further considering its decision along with Japan. If the application of
the NHPA in Okinawa has not been problematical as to foreign policy or
military affairs, the policy reasons relied upon by the Aspin court for
applying the extraterritoriality presumption to NEPA appear to vanish.

B.

Even Under a Recent US. Supreme Court Decision Focusing the
Presumption Against Extraterriton'ality on the Statutory Text,
NEPA and the ESA Should Apply to the Okinawa Base Relocation

Justice Scalia, with at least four other judges, attempted to constrain
deeper analysis of the application of the presumption in his majority
opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd ~>~ He stated, "When
a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none." 165 He argued that "divining what Congress would have wanted" as
1

161. 1960 Status of Force Agreement, supra note 44. Japan is given more authority to
secure service personnel who have committed off-base crimes, but in Cuba, no service personnel
are allowed in Cuba proper.
162. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco}, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); see John H. Knox, A Presumption Against
Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J.lNT'L L. 351 (20 I 0).
163. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (discussing Office of the Spokesman, Japan Roadmap
for Realignment Implementation, U.S. FORCES JAPAN (May 1, 2006), http://www.usfj.rniVDocu
ments/UnitedStates-JapanRoadmapforRealignmenthnplementation.pdt).
164. 561 u.s. 247 (2010).
165. /dat255.
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to extraterritoriality is mere ''judicial-speculation-made-law" and made it
•
clear that this applies in all cases. 66
Although Justice Scalia seemed to be requiring explicit
extraterritorial statutory language, he_backed off, denyiiig that he was
adopting a "clear statement rule" and allowing textual analysis beyond
simply looking for the words "this law applies abroad." 167 Further, Scalia
seemed to endorse what many comment;ators are now calling the "focus"
theory of the presumption. 168 That is, if the focus of congressional intent
is on the activity that is the subject of the claim, then the presumption
169
does not lie. In Aramco, the focus was on domestic employment. In .
Mom'son, it was on domestic sales of securities. 170 With a NEPA
violation, as discussed in Massey, the focus-as the Supreme Court has
said many times-is agency d~cision making and its procedural
171
requirements.
NEPA has no "clear statement" that says it applies to U.S. agency
projects abroad. However, Congress is quite specific, as noted by the
Massey court discussed above in Part V.A, that NEPA is directed to the
agency decision-making process, not its ultimate wisdom or impacts.
NEPA's whole structure focuses upon U.S. agency decision making and
the specific procedures involving the preparation of its environmental
impact analysis, as discussed at the beginning of this Part. 172
Further, Congress clearly had policy goals to protect the world's
environment with NEPA. The 'statute speaks of "man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment," 173
presumably referring to all people of the world. It speaks to the ~'critical
importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the
•
overall welfare and development of man." 174
The statute also specifically includes the goals of assuring that all
"Americans" are safe and that our "national heritage" is protected. 175
166. ld at 261.
167. Jd at 265 (quoting Ammco, 499 u.s. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
168. Eg., Erick D. Rigby, Think Locally, Act Globally: The Presumption Against
Extraterritorial Application ofAmerican Statutes and§ 7(a)(2) ofthe Endangered Species Ac~ 50
DUQ. L. REv. 859, 889 (2012)(referencing Monison,.561 U.S. at 247).
·
169. .Ammco, 499 U.S. at 255.
170. Momson, 561 U.S. at 266.
171. SeeVt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. CoWicil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978) ("[NEPA] is to insure a fully informed and we11-considered decision.").
172. See id (citing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332;
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Cha11enging Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S.
289,319 (1975)).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)(2012).
174. Id
175. ld § 4331(2), (4).
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Furthermore, the statute states that Congress recognizes that "each
person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment." 176
•
Moreover, NEPA explicitly references world impacts:
[A]11 agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where
consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate
support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the
quality ofmankinds world environment 171
Based upon the above-quoted section, Congress seems to be directing
U.S. agencies in their NEPA decision making to have a global perspective
consistent with U.S. foreign policy. That decision making is exactly what
is at issue in Okinawa.
Other tools of statutory construction suggest NEPA's extraterritoriality. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an executive
office entity charged under NEPA with coordinating and overseeing the
nation's environmental policies, 178 issues the fundamental regulations
implementing NEPA. 179 Pursuant to its authority, the CEQ's chairman
issued a memorandum determining that NEPA's reference to the "human
environment'' includes other nations. 8° Courts are to give the CEQ's
interpretation substantial deference. 181
Justice Scalia may have wanted to close the door on a deeper
analysis of when the presumption applies. But with a statute like NEPA,
the considerations identified by the Massey case might ~till apply, as
discussed above, if they illuminate textual analysis in "context" when
there is no clear statement as permitted by Morrison. 182

176. /d§4331(c).
177. ld § 4332(2)(F) (emphasis added).
178. ld §§ 4342, 4344.
179. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2013).
180. Russell W. Peterson, Memorandum on the Application of the EIS Requirement to
Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major Federal Actions (Sept. 24, 1976), National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,068 (Dec. 1, 1977).
181. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (citing Warm Spring Dam Task
Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309-10 (1974)). President Carter did issue Executive Order
12114, further refining and restricting how agencies were to implement NEPA internationally;
however, the Order is considered ineffective by many commentators and without legal authority.
See Karen A. Klick, Note, The Extraterritorial Reach of NEPAs EIS Requirement After
Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 291 (1994).
182. Morrison v. Nat'! Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S . 247, 265 (20 10) ("Assuredly context can
be consulted as well. But whatever sources of statutory meaning one consults to give 'the most
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The ESA brings an additional array of arguments to bear. Like
NEPA, there is no explicit language regarding extraterritoriality.
However, also like NEPA, the text reveals that Congress's ambitions had
global implications. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit summarized the key language in its decision in Defenders of
Wildlife v. Lujan. 183 For example, "the United States has pledged itself as
a sovereign state in the international community to conserve to the extent
practicable the various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing
extinction." 184 In listing species to be protected under the ESA, to assure
species conservation, the Secretary of the Interior is required to consider
species protected by any other country and to inform that country if the
species is to be listed. 13s Numerous species outside of the United States
186
have been so designated.
Pursuant to this language, the Secretary of Interior issued a final
rule on January 4, 1978, requiring U.S. agencies to ensure that their
activities and programs do not jeopardize endangered species in foreign
countries, thus confirming its extraterritoriality. 187 When a new secretary
in 1983 tried to reverse course and eliminate extraterritoriality, the Eighth
Circuit in Defenders ofWJldlifestruck it down for violating the statute. 188
Although the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision, it
dodged the issue of extraterritoriality. Instead, it reversed and dismissed
the case with its famous holding on standing. 189 As a result, the
extraterritoriality of the ESA "remains unsettled and academics have
19
debated Lujan from various angles." ° Current United States
Department of the Interior regulations continue to limit the consultation
requirement to federal actions "in the United States or upon the high
191
seas."
However, no case law has challenged the Eighth Circuit's
analysis in Defenders of Wildlife directly, and the court's statutory
analysis still seems sound even in light of Mom'son.

faithful reading' of the text . ..."(quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Anunco), 499 U.S. 244,
280 (1991 )).
183. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), revtion other grounds, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
184. Endangered Species Act ofl973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4)(2012).
185. Jd § 1533(b)(I)(B)(i)-(ii), (b)(5)(B).
186. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 119 (citing Defenders ofWildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1040
(8th Cir. 1988)).
187. Intemgency Coopemtion- Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. 874, 875
(Jan. 4, 1978) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 402).
188. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 125.
189. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 ( 1992).
190. Rigby, supmnote 168, at 860 (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
191 . 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (2013).
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A Separate Line ofCases Sustaining the ESAs Authority Under
the Commerce Clause Strengthens the ESAs Extraterritoriality

An additional line of cases sustaining the ESA's authority under the
Commerce Clause also supports rejecting the presumption's application
to the ESA. Federal judges have repeatedly found that Congress
recognized the importance of protecting biodiversity to assure the
continuing and future "availability of a wide variety of species to
interstate commerce."192 As the House Report accompanying the ESA
put it, by pushing species towards extinction, ''we threaten their-and our
own-genetic heritage. The value of this genetic heritage is, quite
literally, incalculable." 193
Thus, what happens globally with endangered species does affect
what happens locally, placing the impacts within our own border.
Applying the ESA to U.S. projects taking place beyond our borders is, in
that sense, not extraterritorial because the ultimate effects are local.
Using an analogous approach, the Ninth Circuit applied CERCLA to a
Canadian company whose release of hazardous substances eventually
travelled to a river in the United States and threatened further
contamination, finding no issue of extraterritoriality. 194
One might argue that the fate of·the Okinawa dugong, given its
marginal numbers located in a distant shoreline, will never impact U.S.
interstate commerce. The courts, however, consider biodiversity's
potential future benefits in ESA analysis. 195 The Senate Report
accompanying the ESA stated no animal could be said to be de minimis
for purpose of biodiversity for if "a species is lost, its distinctive gene
material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to ·mankind in
improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or

192. Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)); sec San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v.
Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475,
1481 (9th Cir. 1996); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978))("The ESA protects
the future and unanticipated interstate-commerce value of species."); see also GDF Realty Invs.,
Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[O]ur analysis of the interdependenccr of
species compels the conclusion that regulated takes under [the] ESA do affect interstate
commerce."); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
193. In re Delta Smelt Consol. Cases, 663 F. Supp. 2d 922, 941 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4 (1973)) afftl, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011)).
194. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006).
195. Conservation Force v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 994 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Nat'l
A.s:Y'~ ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052). Judge Wald in National A.s:Yn ofHome Builders
referred to a species' "option value," 130 F.3d at 1053, while Judge Henderson cited the
"interconnectedness of species and ecosystem." ld at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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196

environmental contamination, is. also irretrievably lost." Further, the
Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich, a decision upholding the regulation
of locally grown marijuana, 197 determined, "[W]hen 'a gene~al regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character
198
of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence."'
The Supreme Court and various circuits have held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality gives way when activities outside
U.S. borders affect activities within U.S, borders. 199 Admittedly, the
Supreme Court has now rejected the traditional "effects" test in
Morrison. 200 However, as Justice Stevens pointed out and Scalia
seemingly has concurred, what was once the effects test may still be
relevant if Congress's intent, as shown through text and legislative
201
documents, were to addr~ss those local effects.
In sum, Congress intended the ESA to address the loss of
biodiversity by even one endangered species because those impacts could
affect interstate commerce and the future health and survival of the
American people. It sought to address those impacts by regulating the
decisions of U.S. agencies that cause those impacts. U.S. law should
therefore be applied to protect the Okinawa dugong.
VI. RECONCILING EXTRATERRITORIALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE,
AND JUDICIAL MILITARISM WITH OKINAWA

As discussed above, there are considerable leg~l arguments for
applying NEPA and the ESA to the Okinawa base relocation. NEPA and
the ESA's extraterritoriality is bolstered by the nation's commitment over
the past twenty years to the principles of environmental justice. At the
same time, a modem "Judicial Militarism" in the federal courts gives
great deference to the U.S. military. Resolving these two seemingly
opposed doctrines is key to achieving justice in Okinawa.

196. Nat'/ Assn of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1051 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3
(1969)).
197. 545 u.s. 1 (2005).
198. ld at 17 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
199. Knox, supra note 162, at 392-93 IU1.250; 260-261. The Massey court noted these
cases, mostly involving patent, antitrust, or trademark laws, in its decision. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc.
v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280
(1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Laker Airways Ltd.
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968)).
200. Morrison v. Nat'! Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
201. ld at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509
u.s. 155, 177 (1993)).
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Applying NEPA and the ESA to the Okinawa Base Siting Is
Consistent with the Environmental Justice Doctrine Incorporated
into Federal Decision Making

On the federal level, "environmental justice" is an executive branch
doctrine ultimately based on the United States Constitution's guarantee of
202
"equal protection" and various federal laws.
It has been left
undisturbed by Congress and administrations of different political parties
for the past twenty years.
Environmental justice as a doctrine began with a social protest
movement in the 1980s.203 The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) under the George W Bush Administration began reporting
204
The social
and documenting the problem in the United States.
movement reached a national consensus in what was declared to be a
"People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit" in 1991.205 That
Summit was notable for not only the convening of national activists, but
also for its articulation of the "Principles of Environmental Justice."206
These Principles have a global perspective and mark that activists had
gathered "to begin to build a national and international movement of all
peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and
communities." 207 Many of the principles reflect this international
theme. 208
•

202. . U.S. CONST. amend. XIY, § 1; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2012); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); see
Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 27,9, 280 (Feb. I 1, I 994).
The author has comprehensively examined the federal doctrine in Ramo, supra note 126.
203. Dollie Burwell & Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle: Wamm
County Before and Ailer, 1 GoLDEN GATE U. ENVn. L.J. 9, I 0 (2007).
204. See Environmental Equil)'. Reducing Risk for All Communities (EPA 230-R-92-008),
U.S. ENVn. PRar. AGENCY 2-3 (June 1992), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources!reports/
annual-project-reportslreducing_risk_com__vol2.pdf.
205. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice in the 21st Centuiy, ENVTL. JusT.
REsoURCE CENTER, http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/ejinthe21century.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2014)
("The [Summit] was probably the most important single event in the movement's history.").
206. The Principles ofEnvironmental Justice (EJ), supra note 2.
207. /d
208. Key international principles include:
2. Environmental Justice demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and
justice for all peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias ....
5. Environmental Justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural
and environmental self-determination of all peoples. . . . 10. Environmental Justice
considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation of international
law. . . . 15. Environmental Justice opposes military occupation, repression and
exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms.

ld
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The movement culminated in President Clinton's environmental
justice executive order addressing "disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects" on "minority" and "low-income
209
populations" in the United States and its territories. The executive
order was followed by numerous reports and policies adopted by federal
agencies to implement the order.210 The EPA defined "environmental
justice" broadly as
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies. . . . Fair treatment means that no group of people should bear a
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or
policies.'.l 1'

President Clinton identified NEPA as a key tool for environmental
justice in his memorandum accompanying his executive prder.212 The
EPA has affirmed the relationship between NEPA and environmental
justice.213 Given the disproportionate impacts from military bases in
Okinawa on its minority population, discussed in Parts III and IV above,
NEPA as well as the ESA seem essential to comprehensively address the
environmental justice impacts from the Okinawa base relocation.
B.

A Modem "Judicial Militarism" Nevertheless Gives Great
Deference to the Military

Opposed to the application of environmental justice principles
through the extraterritorial use ofNEPA or the ESA for the U.S. Okinawa
base siting is the increasingly ·powerful doctrine of great judicial
deference in military matters, a kind of "judicial militarism." Historically,
as described above, foreign policy· concerns were a factor driving the
principle against the extraterritoriality of U.S. statutes. Added to this
historical wariness is a more modem capitulation to military
209. Exec. Order No. 12,898,59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). The full title is Federal
Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.
Jd
210. Eg., Dep't of Def., Strategy on Environmental Justice, DENIX (Mar. 24, 1995),
http://www.denix.osd.miV/references/upload/DoD-Environmental-Justice-Strategy-24-Mar-1995.
pdf.
211 . Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PRar. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/environmental
justice/basics/index.html (last updated May 24, 2012).
212. Memorandum of Environmental Justice, supra note 202, at 280.
213. Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA
Compliance Analyses, U.S. ENVTL. PRar. AGENCY § 1 (Apr. 1998), http://www.epa.gov/environ
mentaljusticelresources/policy-ej-guidance-nepa-epa0498.pdf.
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considerations in the context of a culture where "Americans are
enthralled with military power."214
The aftermath of the Vietnam War was a crucial time for the
country as it reconsidered its attitude towards the military. As Boston
University Professor Andrew J. Bacevich, a Vietnam Veteran, put it:
"The new American militarism made its appearance in reaction to the
1960s and especially to Vietnam.'ms
For most Americans, the Vietnam War was seen as a disaster that
should never be repeated, and it is ,no surprise that Senator McGovern's
campaign theme for President in 1972 was that the United States should
come home. 216 The neoconservatives learned a different lesson. For them,
"military power-not merely adequate, but superior power-was for the
United States .a sine qua non."217 Vietnam was a disaster because the
military was restrained and not allowed to do its job. As President
Reagan put it: "They came home;without a victory not because they'd
been defeated, but because they'd been denied permission to win."218
As this post-Vietnam militarism evolved, the U.S. military
emphasized the need to intervene with overwhelming force, without
undue interference from civilian institutions. 219 Perpetual military
preparedness around the world was the preeminent strategy, with bases in
more than 100 countries220 and an isolated voluntary mi}itary firmly
supported, if not participated in, by the general public. 221
Supreme Court decisions involving the military reflected these
political dynamics and changes. In the 1950s and '60s, the Court had no
hesitation in reigning in military jurisdiction, noting its anti-democratic
characteristics. In Reid v. Cove~ the Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision,
held that military criminal jurisdiction overseas during tiffies of peace
does not extend to civilian dependents, upholding the civilian court's

214. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN Mn.ITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE
SEDUCEDBYWAR 1 (2013).
215. Id at 5-6 (citing Norman Podhoretz, Making the World Safe for Communism,
COMMENTARY (Apr. 1, 1976), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/making-the-worldsafe-for-communism/).
216. ld at 74.
21 7. Id (citing Norman Podhoretz, The NcxrConservative Anguish over Reagan s Foreign
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1982, (Magazine), at 30).
218. ld at 107 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Presenting the Medal of Honor to
Master Sergeant Roy P. Benavidez, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 24, 1981), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43454).
219. /dat48,5i-52.
220. ld at 17 (citing CHALMERS ioHNSON, THE SORROWS OF E~IRE, MILITARISM,
SECRECY,ANDTHEENDOFTHEREPUBLIC 154 (2004)).
221. Id at 22-23.
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ability to issue a writ of habeas corpus. 222 Justice Black, in a plurality
opinion for the Court, which included Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas and Brennan, stated, "Every extension of mili~ jurisdiction is
an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, more
important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of other
treasured constitutional protections."223 Justice Black went further by
noting the Founders' Constitution's healthy distrust of the military, "a
necessary institution, but one dangerous to 4berty if not confined within
its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. They knew that
ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders." 224
Justice Black also reJected that Cold War tensions and the need for
military preparedness were sufficient bases for the expansion of military
jurisdiction where there was no actual conflict. 225
Similarly, the Supreme Court restricted jurisdiction over discharged
226
soldiers, civilian overseas employees,227 and even those in the service
where their crimes are not "service connected."228 By 1972, the Supreme
Court was even willing to assert civilian judicial control over a
serviceman claiming to be a conscientious objector facing a courtmartial for refusing to board a plane to Vietnam. 229 The Court in Parisi v.
Davidson unanimously found no reason to restrain civilian jurisdiction
out of"comity" for a pending military court-martial.230 Justice Douglas's
concurrence in Pansi is a bold assertion of the need for civilian courts ''to
keep the military within bounds."231 According to Justice Douglas:
"[T]he Pentagon is not yet sovereign. The military is simply another
administrative agency, insofar as judicial review is concemed."232
But once the Nixon appointees Justice William Rehnquist ~d Chief
Justice Warren Burger were on the Court, and with the new conservative
doctrine that the Vietnam disaster was a result of civilian meddling in the
military's affairs, the tide began to shift towards judicial militarism. With
Justice Rehnquist participating, Chief Justice Burger in a 5-4 decision in
222. 354 u.s. 1, 39-40 (1957).
223. Id at 21.
224. Id at 23-24.
225. See id at 35.
226. United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) (quoting U.S.CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 14).
227. McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 287 (1959).
228. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,272-73 (1969).
229. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,45 (1972).
230. Id at 46. Notably the new Justice Rehnquist, appointed by President Nixon, did not
participate in the case.
231. Id at 49 (Douglas, J., concurring).
232. Id at 51 (citing Comment, supmnote 1, at 377-78).
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Laird v. Tatum upheld a military domestic intelligence-gathering
program from a challenge, m arguing that there was no justiciable
controversy because the mere existence of the program did not constitute
a present or future harm.234
Justice Douglas vehemently dissented: "Our tradition reflects a
desire for civilian supremacy and subordination of military power."235 He
further emphasized the difference between judicial deference in
peacetime to a time of declared war: "In times of peace, the factors
leading to an extraordinary deference to claims of military necessity have
naturally not been as weighty. This has been true even in the all too
imperfect peace that has been our lot for the past fifteen years--and quite
rightly so, in my judgment."236
By 1974, the Supreme Court's new majority fully embraced and
articulated this shift towards a judicial militarism. In a 6-2 decision,
Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Parker v. Levy upheld the courtmartial of an Army Captain for statements against the Vietnam War. 237
The Captain argued that the application of a Uniform Code of Military
Justice provision prohibiting "conduct unbecomjng an officer and a
gentleman"238 to political statements was improper as unconstitutionally
vague.
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning was dramatically different from the
prior court decisions described above. He spoke of the different
"military community."239 He then concluded that a lesser standard of
scrutiny applies to the military society than to civilian society "[b]ecause
of the factors differentiating military society from civilian society."240
In one fell swoop, the military went from being just another
administrative agency to a "society" entitled to deference as long as it is
not arbitrary. Thus even First Amendment protections must be adjusted
for the military given that ''the different character of the military

233. 408 u.s. 1 (1972).
234. See id at 13-16. Justice Burger still feels the need to defend the civilian jurisdiction
of the courts over the military, noting the "traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any
military intrusion into civilian affairs" and "our traditional insistence on limitations on military
operations in peacetime." Jd at 15.
235. Jd at 19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
236. ld at 20 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill ofRights and the Military, 37 N.YU. L. REv.
181, 193 (1962)). Notably, those years include the time during the Vietnam War.
237. 417 u.s. 733 (1974).
238. 10 u.s.c. § 933 (2012).
239. Parker,417U.S.at752.
240. ld at 756.
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community and of the military mission requires a different application of
those protections."w
This trend continued in a series of key decisions authored by Justice
Rehnquist. In Goldman v. Weinberger, a 5-4 split-court upheld Air Force
regulations prohibiting a Rabbi on active duty in a health clinic from
wearing a Yarmulke. 242 Justice Rehnquist again wrote of the greater
deference given the military "to accomplish its mission:~' "[C]ourts
must give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative' importance of a particular military
244
interest." He complained of courts being "ill-equipped to determine
the impact _upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military
authority might have."145
This sweeping deference to the military was new and was properly
identified by Justice Brennan in dissent: ''The Court, however, evades its
responsibility by eliminating, in all but name only, judicial review of
military regulations that interfere with the fundamental constitutional
rights of service personnel."246 Or as Justice O'Connor stated in dissent,
"It is entirely sufficient for the Court if the military perceives a need for
uniformity."247
One year later, Justice Rehnquist led the charge to overrule
O'CaUahan v. Parkerin Solano v. United States, which gave the military
jurisdiction over service personnel committing non-service connected
248
charges. Justice Rehnquist repeated that courts are "ill-equipped" to
address military matters and that judicial deference is at its "apogee"
249
when addressing rules and regulations of the Armed Forces.
243

C

Judicial Militansm Has Impacted but Not Eliminated the
ApplicatJon ofNEPA and the ESA to the Military

The Supreme Court's modern deference to the military is having
significant impact upon environmental laws. In Weinberger v. Catholic
ActJon of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, Justice Rehnquist for the
Court exempted the Navy from preparing an environmental impact
statement (EIS) under NEPA before completing weapons storage
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id at 758.
475 u.s. 503 (1986).
ld at 507 (citing Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 294,300 (1983)).
Jd (citing Chappel, 462 U.S. at 305).
ld (quoting Chappel, 462 U.S. at 305).
Id at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
ld at 528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
483 U.S. 435,448 (1987) (citing Chappel, 462 U.S. at 305).
ld at447 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,508 (1986)).
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facilities in Hawaii that could store nuclear weapons.250 The Navy had
done an environmental impact assessment (EIA), finding no significant
impacts, but had failed to evaluate the impacts from storing nuclear
weapons because the Navy never reveals if or where it is storing nuclear
weapons. 251 The Ninth Circuit suggested that the Navy do a hyPothetical
EIS to evaluate whether or not nuclear weapons were stored at the site.252
Justice Rehnquist fmmd that the Freedom of Information Act's
(FOIA) exception for government secrets applied: "Congress intended
that the· public's interest in ensuring that federal agencies comply with
NEPA must give way to the Government's need to preserve military
secrets." 253 Justice Rehnquist rejected the circuit court's attempt to
accommodate NEPA to military secrecy through a hypothetical EIS:
"[W]e have held that 'public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit
in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the
disclosure of matters which law itself regards as confidential, and
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.'"254
In Weinbe.rger v. Romero-Barcelo, the Court found that the Navy
was subject to the federal Clean Water Act and therefore needed a permit
before discharging bombs in a training exercise in the ocean near an
island off of Puerto Rico. 255 However, the Court also endorsed the district
court's refusal to give an injunction to stop the bombing: "[B]ecause of
the importance of the island as a training center, 'the granting of the
injunctive relief sought would cause grievous; and perhaps irreparable
harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the general welfare of the
Nation. "'256
More recently the Supreme Court took a more aggressive step in
Wmter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 257 Chief Justice
Roberts, a former clerk to Justice Rehnquist,258 wrote for a five-vote
majority holding that a preliminary injunction to stop the Navy from
sonar training off the Southern California coast in a manner to protect
marine mammals was inappropriate. 259 Justice Roberts framed the case
250. 454 u.s. 139 (1981).
251. Jd at 141.
252. Jd at 140-41 (citing Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d
569, 572 (9th Cir. 1980)).
253 . Id at 145.
254. Id at 146-47 (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)).
255. 456 u.s. 305, 306-07, 320 (1982).
256. ld at 310 (quoting Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 707 (D.P.R. 1979)).
257. 555 u.s. 7, 26 (2008).
258. Biographies of Current Justice of the Supreme Cowt, ~UP. CT. U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/aboutlbiographies.aspx (last visited July 7, 2014).
259. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
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as one involving military professional judgment, and once so framed, he
discussed the doctrines of great deferral and the inadequacy of the courts
to determine the case:
This case involves "complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force," which
are "essentially professional military judgments." We "give great
deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning
the relative importance of a particular military interest." As the Court
emphasized just last Term, "neither the Members of this Court nor most
federal judges begin the day with briefmgs that may describe new and
serious threats to our Nation and its people.',260
•
Justice Roberts accepted without questioning the Navy's
declarations that the district court's restrictions on sonar training in this
area of the ocean would jeopardize its "realistic training" exercise. that "is
of the utmost importance to the Navy and the Nation." 26 1 He concluded
that the balance of equities therefore "tip strongly in favor of the Navy":
For the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury would be harm to an
unknown number of the marine mammals that they study and observe. In
contrast, forcing the Navy to deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine
force jeopardizes the safety of the fleet. Active sonar is the only reliable
technology for detecting and tracking enemy diesel-electric submarines,
and the President-the Commander in Chief-has determined that training
with active sonar is "essential to national security.'o262
Notice how Justice Roberts converted a, single training program in one
area of the ocean with restrictions into "an inadequately trained
antisubmarine force" that ')eopardizes the safety of the fleet." He did
this based on what he characterizes as the "credibly alleged" claim of a
threat to national security. 263
Yet even with this great deference, none of these cases found
environmental law to be inapplicable to the U.S. military, nor did the
military make that claim. As described above, in Catholic Action of
Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the Navy did perform an EIA pursuant
to NEPA, and the court merely reconciled the FOIA and NEPA. The
Navy also was required to obtain a Clean Water Act permit in RomeroBarcelo. The Navy in Wintei.S' did do an EIA, and the Court never
260. Id (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 ( 1986); Bownedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).
261. /d at 25.
262. Id at 26 (quoting Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 232a, Wmtcr,
555 U.S. 7 (No. 07-1239)).
263. Id at 32-33.
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reached the issue of whether it needed to do an EIS, only addressing
whether an injunction was appropriate. None of these cases preclude
applying environmental law to the U.S. military.
D.

Judicial Militansm Should Be Questioned; However, in Okinawa,
NEPA and the ESA Do Not Conflict with MJ1itary Necessity and
Should Apply

This evolution in deferral to the military's claims of military
necessity is daunting for those challenging military authority. However,
the historical and ideological roots of this great deferral doctrine may
well be worth questioning. There are many reasons to question the
political stance that the failure in Vietnam had anything to do with
civilian interference with the U.S. military. 264 This questioning may be
ripe now as the United States confronts its post-Iraq withdrawal debacle,
suggesting that U.S. military misadventures may have more to do with
fundamental policy failure than with too much civilian restraint on the
military. 265 Judicial militarism is not a constitutional doctrine and should
not be of service to political agendas to eliminate the post-Vietnam
syndrome and encourage foreign military intervention.
Yet, even with the full force of this modem capitulation to the
"military society," none of these cases weighing military necessity and
environmental protection hold the military to be immune from
environmental statutes. The key, given the current court's militaristic
paradigm, is to show that there is no real conflict between asserting
environmental laws' extraterritorially and military necessity.
There is no dispute that Okinawa still provides a strategic value to
the U.S. military, given conflicts with North Korea and China. 266
However, it is a different matter as to the "number of marines necessary
264. Based upon the so-called "Pentagon Papers," it is far more likely the war's failure
resulted from bad policy conducted with too little transparency about trying to suppress a war of
independence conducted by determined people. Sec DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: f\ MEMOIR OF
VIETNAM AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS 249-55 (2002).
265. See Peter Beinart, Obama s Disastrous Iraq Policy: An Autopsy, ATLANTIC (June 23,
2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2014/06/obamas-disastrousiraq-policy-an-autopsy/373225/, and Fareed Zakaria, Mlo Lost Iraq? The Iraqis Did, with an
Assist /ivm George W Bush, WASH. POST (June 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/fareed-zakaria-who-lost-lraq-the-lraqis-did-with-an-assist-from-george-w-bush/2014/06/
12/35c5a418-F25c-ll e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_Story.html, for examples of this questioning from
different perspect1ves.
266. CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 2 ("The U.S. military presence in
Japan, and particularly Okinawa, allows it to fulfill its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security to not only defend Japan but to maintain security in the AsiaPacific region.'').
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267

to maintain stability ' and their specific location. At least three key U.S.
senators in 20 ll and 2012 questioned the realignment plan and
wondered why the MCAS Futenma operations were not consolidated
•
with the Air Force's Kadena Air Base.268
In the case of the Okinawan dugong, where the U.S. military and
Japan have taken almost a decade to resolve the location of the MCAS
Futenma, there is no immediate necessity for rushing a decision, which
allows for a full environmental analysis to be conducted. The problem
was not that military necessity prevented the DOD from considering the
impacts to the dugong. The DOD claimed it was willing and in fact did
con8ider the impacts with a variety of studies, but they did so in a
patently flawed manner. 269
Further, the United States and Japan have recognized that applying
U.S. environmental laws to U.S. bases is consistent with their national
interests. The SCC on September 11, 2000, issued a "Joint Statement of
Environment Principles," noting "the increasing importance of protecting
the environment."270 The goal is to prevent "pollution on facilities and
27 1
The
areas the use of which is granted to the U.S. armed forces."
methodology for protection is "selecting the more protective standards
from relevant U.S. and Japanese laws and regulations."272 Both countries
recognized that there was no conflict with domestic Japanese laws in
picking more stringent U.S. laws for compliance: "[U.S. armed forces in
Japan] environmental standards generally meet or exceed those set by
relevant laws and regulations of Japan."273
The illusion that there is a conflict between military necessity and
base siting arose in a case related to the situation in Okinawa, . though
267. ld
268. ld at I I (referring to Carl Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John
McCain, ranking minority member of that committee; and Jim Webb, Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs).
269. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1109-11 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
270. Joint Statement ofEnvironmental Principles, MINISTRY FORF.IG AFF. JAPAN (Sept. 11,
2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/regionln-america/us/seeurity/environment.html.
271. ld
272. Id
273. ld The United States and Japan more recently reaffirmed these principles in a joint
press statement, pledging again to use "the more protective of U.S. standards, generally applied
and enforced Japanese national standards, or any applicable international agreement standards."
Joint Announcement on a Framework Regarding Environmental Stewardship at US. Anned
Forces Facilities and Areas in Japan, U.S. EMBASSY JAPAN (Dec. 23, 2013), http://japan.
usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20131225-0l.html. In addition, both countries agreed to negotiate new
agreements based upon "taking environmental measures around the U.S. Armed Forces facilities
and areas to improve further environmentally friendly living conditions of both local communities
and those with in the U.S. Armed Forces facilities and areas." Jd
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significantly, it occurred in a U.S. territory, thereby avoiding the
extraterritoriality issue. Part of the realignment of Okinawa's U.S. bases
274
involves sending 9,000 Marines to Guam. The Navy chose a site for a
firing range that is sacred to the indigenous people· of Guam and listed on
the National Register of Historic Places. Local activists and the National
Trust for Historic Preservation sued under NEPA, the NHPA, and the
Coastal Zone Management Act. They argued that there were alternative
275
sites reasonably available, among other arguments.
Negotiations during the Guam case were soon met by claims of
military necessity, with at least one military official looking at the
plaintiffs' activists and lawyers and reportedly ~aying, "[I]f we don't put
it there, your children will die."276 Yet, the Navy eventually agreed to do a
supplemental EIS and evaluate additional alternatives. After a two-year
evaluation, the Navy found an available alternative site at an existing Air
Force base that will not affect sacred land. 277
The fact that Guam is a territory and Okinawa is a former de facto
colony should not be a significant determinant in balancing
environmental val:ues with military necessity. Congress's essential
message in both NEPA and the ESA is that protecting environmental
values nationally and internationally is consistent with the national
interest. That insight is what led the CEQ to issue its memorandum
supporting NEPA extraterritoriality:
We believe that by taking account of likely impacts abroad before deciding
on a proposal for action, federal agencies can obtain the same benefits of
NEPA review that accompany the development of projects or actionswith domestic impacts. Moreover, we believe such analyses can be
accomplished without imposing U.S. environmental standaids on other
countries, and without interfering with the execution of foreign policy. To
the contrary, such analysis and disclosure can provide useful information to
cooperating governments. Finally, if agencies undertake these analyses in
cooperation with involved foreign governments, U.S. agencies can promote

274. Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Voluntary Remand and Stay at 2, Guam Pres.
Trust v. Gregory, No. 10-00677,41 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,221 (D. Haw. 2011).
275. Id at4.
276. Conversation with Nicholas Yost, Plaintiffs' Lawyer (Feb. 25, 20 14). Nicholas Yost is
the former CEQ general counsel and the recipient of the American Bar Association's 2010 Award
for Distinguished Achievement in Environmental Law and Policy. Nicholas C .IV~ DENfONS,
http://www.dentons.com/en/nicholas-yost (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).
277. Matthew M. Burke, New Navy Report Could Clear ~y for Marines' Move fivm
Okinawa to Guam, STARS & STRIPES (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/new-navyreport-could-clear-way-for-marines-move-from-okinawa-to-guam-1.278611.
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international approaches to environmental protection as recommended in
the Stockholm Declaration and elsewhere.278

The same could be said in regard to the principles of.environme!J.tal
justice. If Okinawa was a legal U.S. territory, there would be no question
that Okinawans are a minority population that have not been given "fair
treatment" because they "bear a disproportionate share of the negative
environmental consequences" resulting from the U.S. base . siting
decisions. 279
Respecting the Okinawan population and its cultural and
environmental heritage is not antithetical to military interests or foreign
policy. There is no need for an immediate relocation, as discussed above,
implicating the injunction issues addressed in Wmtei.S' and RomeroBarcelo. The United States has agreed with Japan to "delink" the base
relocation from its other plans for withdrawing troops from Okinawa.280
It will be years before the expansion can be built, and there are no
immediate training exercises. 281 There is no valid military or foreign
policy reason to avoid applying U.S. environmental laws to the Okinawa
base relocation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The conflict over the MCAS Futenma relocation is an opportunity
for the U.S. military to address long-standing environmental justice
issues in Okinawa. Applying U.S. environmental laws to the DOD's
decisions regarding base locations in Okinawa enhances rather than
undermines foreign policy and military interests. The commitment to
environniental justice is particularly apt given Okinawa's cultural and
social history, its occupation and postoccupation status after reversion,
and its continued disproportionate burden from the U.S. military's bases
and operations.
The core value in environmental justice, mutual respect between
decision-makers and the community affected, can lead to a better
solution. It can also be an example of how preserving one endangered
278. Russell W. Peterson, Memorandum to Heads of Agencies on Applying the EIS
Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad (Sept. 24, 1976), 42 Fed. Reg. 61,068 (Dec. 1,
1977).
279. Environmental Justice, supmnote 211.
280. Sec'y of Def. et al., Joint Statement of the Secun'ty Consultative Committee,
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/
security/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf("(T]he Ministers decided to delink both the 'relocation of
the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land .
returns·south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenrna Replacement Facility.").
281. Slavin, Sumida & Harper, supm note 114.
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species, the Okinawa dugong, is intimately related to building a
sustainable human community. The U.S. federal courts, by properly
applying principles of extraterritoriality and asserting their constitutional
role in reviewing military activities, are in a position to assure justice for
Okinawans.

